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Climate action in the European Commission’s natural gas policy 
 
John Szabo1 
 
 
Abstract 
Natural gas has been understood to be the transition fuel allowing inter alia the European 
Union to substitute more polluting fossil fuels when moving to a renewable energy-based 
society. This role has been based on it yielding the least emissions upon combustion, which 
had insulated it from the negative impacts of climate policy. A combination of an extensive 
infrastructure and legal-technical framework, widely adopted consumer practices, and the 
transition fuel narrative both built on and furthered the lock-in of the fuel. Natural gas policy 
essential refrained from incorporating significant climate considerations and the fuel was 
assumed to have bright future. As the European Commission’s climate action became more 
stringent, the parallel paths of climate and natural gas policy eventually collided. The 
promulgaters of the transition fuel narrative, the natural gas industry, was unprepared for 
such changes. However, it was quick to mobilise and devise strategies to sustain its role in 
the EU’s energy future—the impacts of which are yet to be seen. 
JEL: F500; Q340; Q480 
Keywords: EU; natural gas; transition fuel; climate policy; energy transition 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Commission2 has reshaped the European Union’s (EU) natural gas 
markets during the past three decades. It rolled out natural gas directives and 
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Tóth Kálmán str. 4, H-1097 Budapest, Hungary. Email: szabo.john@krtk.mta.hu. And, PhD Candidate, 
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introduced pivotal policy packages to support an efficient, secure, and competitive 
market. This paper explores how climate considerations shaped the Commission’s 
actions, given the rising influence of supranational climate policy. It sets out to answer 
the following research question: how has the European Commission's natural gas policy-
making reflected climate action? I hypothesise that climate policy and energy policy 
largely remained bifurcated and only began to converge relatively recently in the EU. 
This was partially reliant on the fuel’s lock-in and stakeholders accepting the narrative 
that natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel and it could play the role of a transition fuel—a 
source of energy that can substitute more polluting fossil fuels en route to a renewable 
energy mix. To answer the research question and explore the proposed hypothesis, I 
assess the EU’s natural gas policy since the establishment of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 to see how it reflects 
climate considerations.This paper takes a chronological approach to understand how 
climate change’s impact filtered into the Commission’s natural gas policy. It surveys six 
epochs, which structure the paper. First, I begin by discussing the lead up to the First 
Energy Package—introduced in 1998—which overlapped with the launch of a global 
climate agenda in Rio. Second, I explore the lead up to the Second Energy Package and 
how liberalisation was (not particularly) impacted by climate considerations. Third, I 
turn to the Third Energy Package. Fourth, I assess the proliferating transition fuel 
discourse in the late-aughts and the early-2010s. Fifth, I explore the impact of the Paris 
Agreement and subsequent climate policy, which proved to be a pivotal turning point. 
Sixth, I survey the natural gas industry’s response to rising climate action in recent 
years. In the final section, I draw conclusions and articulate my main findings. The paper 
is based on the analysis of main European Commission natural gas and climate policy 
documents issued during the assessed epochs. This entailed the rigorous document 
analysis of over one hundred directives, communications, press releases, and other 
publications issued by the Commission. I conducted a further forty-nine interviews to 
structure my analysis and analysed a further 150+ documents, reports, position papers, 
and public statements issued by key stakeholders between 1992 and 2018. 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Unless noted otherwise, this paper uses ‘Commission’ to refer to the European Commission for short. 
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2. The onset of natural gas market engineering 
A need for coordinated global climate action was propelled on the agendas of 
policy-makers throughout the world following the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992 
at the Rio Conference. While a number of COP participants heralded the need to reduce 
emissions, this did not yet translate into action that would curtail greenhouse gas 
emissions. Natural gas was a particularly well insulated fuel from climate action, since it 
had been understood to be the least polluting fossil fuel, given its relatively low NOx, 
SOx, CO2, and particulate matter emissions upon combustion. These physical parameters 
coupled with the extensive lock-in of the fuel predicated on its infrastructure, 
framework to govern its markets, and the entrenched consumption practices lent 
credence to the narrative that natural gas is the transition fuel which can help society 
move from more polluting fossil fuels (e.g. coal) to a renewable energy-based social 
system. This narrative had been widely accepted on environmental grounds (i.e. 
focusing on air pollution), but with the beginning of global society’s focus on tackling 
climate change it was adapted—the IPCC (1990) being amongst the first prominent 
institutions to identify the transitory role natural gas could play. 
Early climate action had little impact on energy policy, but it had particularly 
limited implications on European natural gas markets which were thriving in the 1990s. 
Spearheaded by the UK, where the government’s decision to liberalise its market 
coupled with the exploitation of North Sea resources spurred the dash for gas, which 
entailed large-scale coal-to-gas switching (Newbery, 1998; Winskel, 2002). 
Environmental considerations only played a minor role in this dynamic: air pollution 
alleviation was a marginal factor at best, overshadowed by the prospect of a 
domestically produced hydrocarbons paying a greater role, while providing an 
alternative to a volatile coal industry. The Commission followed the UK’s lead, repealing 
the prohibition limiting natural gas burning for electricity generation3 en route to 
liberalising the EU’s natural gas market. This, paired with rising supply from the North 
Sea, boosted the fuel’s, prompting the Commission to further pursue the liberalisation of 
mainland Europe’s natural gas market as well (Matlary, 1997; Herweg, 2015). 
                                                 
3 COM(95) 478 final, 18.10.1995. 
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The Commission had formulated its idea of an internal energy market and a 
common energy policy in a Green Paper4, which also called for a need to address the 
environmental implications of energy consumption. Its approach suggested that it would 
address the consumption of more polluting and CO2-intensive fossil fuels (e.g. coal) 
before natural gas. Accordingly, environmental grounds supported the adoption of 
natural gas as opposed to curtailing its consumption, leading the Commission to pursue 
the development of the fuel’s market. The Council and the Parliament’s adopted the First 
Energy Package5. “[T]he first IEM [internal energy market] initiatives, […] merely 
focussed on liberalisation and competitiveness, and not on environmental protection” 
(Fiedler, 2015, p. 5) in contradiction to the EU’s simultaneous ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and its bid to lead global climate action (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). The 
approach was clear in the Commission’s natural gas market interventions; although, in 
natural gas’ case, the congruency stems from the proclaimed approach that natural gas 
could substitute more polluting fossil fuels. 
The Commission’s neglect for environmental concerns was in-part driven by the 
distribution of power within the supranational institution itself. Since the EU and its 
precursors were established, heads of member states envisioned it to be a key actor that 
designed and enforced competition laws. These were initially aimed to limit coal and 
steel dumping by facilitating unfettered intra-Community competition, but the 
supranational institution’s competencies were subsequently expanded to include other 
sectors and issues. The approach led to the concentration of political power in the 
Directorate-General Competition (DG COMP), which was at the heart of the European 
Community’s goal. Only gradually did other Directorate-General’s receive greater 
jurisdiction and a wider array of tasks—including Directorate-General Energy (DG 
ENER) (and its predecessor) in the 1990s (Matlary, 1997). In comparison, Directorate-
General Environment’s (DG ENV)6 role in the EU’s policy-making only began to increase 
in the early-1990s with the Single European Act (SEA), as climate change rose on the 
global policy agenda. Even then, its influence was far overshadowed by the agenda of DG 
COMP and DG ENER. 
                                                 
4 COM(94) 659 final, 11.1.1995 and (European Commission, 1995). 
5 For electricity: Directive 96/92/EC, 19.12.1996 and for natural gas: Directive 98/30/EC, 22.06.1998. 
6 Directorate-General Climate Action was split from DG ENV in 2010. 
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The Commission’s favourable framing of natural gas in the First Energy Package 
and supporting documentation was also shaped by a strengthening global discourse that 
natural gas can be a bridge-7 or a transition fuel from more polluting coal to low-carbon 
alternatives. This, primarily manifested on the level of discourse, since climate policy 
had little impact on the composition of the energy mix. Nonetheless, the idea that natural 
gas will be a transition fuel was first publicised by academics, while it was later—in the 
late aughts and early 2010s—adopted and promulgated by the fossil fuel industry and 
policy-makers as well. It first surfaces in the work of Flavin (1992), who argues—
echoing the First IPCC (1990) Assessment—that society will need a transition fuel to 
shift from fossil fuel-based practices to renewable-reliant ones. He basis his argument 
on natural gas’ ability to alleviate emissions by substituting alternative fossil fuels—a 
position he maintained in later work (Flavin and Lenssen, 1994; Lenssen and Flavin, 
1996). Natural gas’ transitional fuel descriptor also surfaces in an influential paper 
published by Nebojsa Nakicenovic (1994). At the time, the hydrocarbon industry paid 
relatively little attention to these arguments as they undertook a campaign of climate 
denialism (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). 
3. A market in flux 
In the early-2000s, the Commission continued its natural gas market 
liberalisation in response to three factors: (1) changing EU natural gas market dynamics, 
(2) a changing global security context, and (3) moderate economic growth in the EU. 
First, the dash for gas in the EU not only increased natural gas consumption, but 
fundamentally rewrote supply-demand dynamics. It shifted from a predominantly 
seasonal fuel (used for heating) to one consumed throughout the year and whose trade 
required much greater flexibility from actors throughout the supply chain (Hallack, 
2013a). This was coupled with suppliers and infrastructure-owners offering greater 
flexibility to buyers (Hallack, 2013b; Ruester, 2013). Security considerations also 
increased as the global security landscape deterred in the early-2000s, while the EU’s 
natural gas import-reliance increased. The Commission sought to enhance security by 
                                                 
7 Note that leaders in the Soviet Union had already used the term bridging fuel for natural gas, since they 
considered it as the fuel „carrying the Soviet economy from the era of oil toward the coal-and-nuclear 
future of the next century” (Gustafson, 2014, p. 137). 
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dismantling trade barriers and thus enabling the efficient flow of the resource. Despite 
its action, this was to continue to dominate the policy-making agenda for years to come 
(Natorski and Surrallés, 2008). Third, the EU looked to induce competition that would 
suppress energy prices to facilitate economic growth in the bloc, following dwindling 
economic expansion in the early-2000s. These three objectives overshadowed any 
substantive climate-related intervention in natural gas markets. 
The Commission introduced the Second Energy Package8 to engineer a 
competitive and secure natural gas market. Its key theme was unbundling, meaning that 
it sought to separate infrastructure ownership from the trade and, on occasion, 
production of the fuel—these activities were frequently housed under the roof of a 
single vertically integrated company that dominated its market. The goal was to open 
transit capacities for competition, reducing rent-seeking activities in relation to natural 
gas infrastructure. The Commission also sought to justify its actions on environmental 
grounds. The Directive states that “Member States shall ensure [… that] natural gas 
undertakings are operated in accordance with the principles of this Directive with a 
view to achieving a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable market in 
natural gas”9. 
A focal piece of EU energy legislation suggested that natural gas offers an 
“environmentally sustainable source of energy”. This is an oxymoron per definition, but 
reflects the widely accepted narrative that natural gas as a transition fuel can lower 
emissions by substituting more polluting fossil fuels, thereby making the energy mix 
more sustainable. In-fact, it made the economy less carbon intensive, but its non-
renewable qualities did not necessarily make it sustainable. This goes to show the strong 
impact a discourse based on a specific narrative can have, when supported by a number 
of interests and the widely-adapted fossil fuel-reliant practices. An interviewee working 
within the Commission’s DG Ener at the time also noted that this was an oversight on 
behalf of policy-makers, but also reflected a win for the natural gas industry, since it 
upheld and codified the favourable framing of the fuel on environmental grounds. 
                                                 
8 For electricity: Directive 2003/54/EC, 26.06.2003 and for natural gas: Directive 2003/55/EC, 26.06.2003. 
9 In this same document, the Commission includes climate change under the umbrella of environmental 
protection. 
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2004 brought a change to the European Union’s energy markets with the Eastern 
Enlargement. This rewrote the framework within which the Commission operated, by 
introducing new energy security dispositions that needed to be aligned into the strategic 
objectives of supranational bodies. Western European countries had relatively well-
diversified natural gas import routes and interconnected markets—both of which 
enhanced supply security. The Commission could focus on increasing competition which 
concomitantly was also understood to have led to higher supply security. This shifted 
with the Eastern Enlargement, since newly joined countries were heavily reliant on 
Russia-sourced natural gas frequently supplied through a single- or a very limited 
number of channels, which left them susceptible to Gazprom’s and—more broadly—the 
Kremlin’s influence. The Commission introduced measures10 to safeguard the supply 
security of natural gas for all EU member states, which it envisioned to achieve via 
greater supranational cooperation and heightened competition. These measures had 
relatively little tangible impact in the early aughts, since increasing competition 
remained in the Commission’s crosshairs. 
Newly joined member states also brought energy mixes where coal played a 
relatively greater role, rekindling arguments that emphasise the benefits of substituting 
coal for natural gas. Newly joined countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic 
brought with them an extensive reliance on coal consumption. Policy-makers and 
leaders of private enterprises also frequently made arguments that emphasised their 
limited means to invest in expensive low carbon technologies, leading them to argue that 
natural gas could significantly alleviate air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions in a 
cost-effective manner. Coal-to-gas switching in Eastern enlargement states was 
especially pertinent, since few alternatives existed at the time—this was before the 
launch of the Energiewende and the decline of renewable energy prices. Natural gas was 
the most plausible source of energy that could reduce emissions, but this argument 
continues to be made by leaders across the board despite plummeting technology prices 
since. This leads many to argue that natural gas’ transitionary role will differ in 
                                                 
10 COM(2002) 488 final, 11.09.2002; COM(2002) 488 – C5-0449/2002 – 2002/0220(COD), 23.09.2003; 
adopted as Council Directive 2004/67/EC, 26.04.2004. 
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(wealthier) countries that are more advanced in their energy transition and (less 
wealthy) countries that still need to undertake extensive change. 
4. The means to ensure a competitive market: the Third Energy Package 
Natural gas policy came to a turning point in 2009, for two reasons: the 
Commission introduced the Third Energy Package11 and Europe faced the largest scare 
to-date stemming from Russia halting natural gas supplies. The introduction of the Third 
Energy Package may have preceded the supply halts, but it was designed to establish a 
well-functioning market that enables an efficient allocation of resources. It sought to 
overcome the shortcomings of the First and Second Energy Packages in creating a 
competitive EU natural gas market, by opening up pipeline capacities for competition 
when instating Third Party Access (TPA). This would have established a competitive 
transmission market in the EU, ending the rent-seeking activities and monopole 
positions of some firms. The industry resisted and contested these measures, but 
ultimately agreed to the new principles. The Commission’s market intervention re-wrote 
the framework within which stakeholders operated, given the wide-ranging changes 
that they abided by they had come to believe that the role of the fuel would be stable for 
years to come. 
The Commission’s Third Energy Package—similarly to the Second Energy 
Package—calls for “a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable internal 
market in natural gas” (articles 3 and 40), re-encoding the paradox of the call for an 
environmentally sustainable internal market in natural gas. It may have been the cleanest 
fossil fuel, but it is not sustainable per definition. The lack of attention in the Third 
Energy Package towards the matter was also surprising, since the Commission had 
decisively shifted to develop an increasingly ambitious climate agenda with the 
introduction of the EU’s emission trading system (EU ETS)—already in Phase 2 as of 
2008—and the EU 2020 goals. These measures paired with the Third Energy Package 
would have continued to back the fuel in substituting more polluting coal. It was to have 
an edge over coal through more efficient markets reducing consumer prices and climate 
tools weighing on more polluting competing fuels. Natural gas demand increased in the 
                                                 
11 Directive 2009/73/EC, 13.07.2019. 
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late aughts and the early-2010s, but this was a rebound to pre-recession levels. 
Meanwhile, the Commission’s undertaking to move consumers away from more 
polluting coal to natural gas did not materialise as carbon prices remained low, the 
European coal industry continued to receive ample state support, and global prices of 
coal imploded following the Great Recession. Natural gas could not capitalise on playing 
a transition fuel role when most had anticipated that it would (Stern, 2017). 
Alongside the Commission’s market-engineering to ensure the functioning of a 
competitive market, the natural gas sector underscored its fuel’s ability to alleviate 
pollution. The proliferation of this positive framing was essential in overcoming the 
fuel’s tarnished image after the 2006 and 2009 gas crises. Supply crises may have 
erupted between the governments of Russia and Ukraine, but Russian natural gas 
supplies through Ukraine dominated the EU’s energy mix; consequently, its impact 
reverberate through most of Europe, weighing on the fuel’s acceptance by policy-makers 
and the broader public. It took years for producers to regain the trust of the general 
public, and they realised that emphasising the environmentally favourable 
characteristics of their source fuel could help their case. Environmental considerations 
offered a strategic opening for the industry to repair the fuel’s image, especially 
considering the Commission’s shift to climate policy with the recently accepted 2020 
goals and the 2030 goals that it was discussing. The message was reflected in Royal 
Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, and Dutch Government-owned Gasterra’s (2009) influential 
‘Natural gas as a transitional fuel: For a sustainable energy future’ report, sketching a 
natural gas-dependent energy transition through 2050 and beyond, but further 
reinforcements of this message were to come. 
5. The golden age of gas 
The natural gas sector’s initiative to emphasise the positive climate-aspects of 
natural gas accelerated in the early-2010s, shaping the Commission’s natural gas policy 
as well. These positions were situated in a setting where there was a proliferation of the 
transition fuel discourse, even amongst some environmental organizations (California 
Environmental Associates, 2007). Moreover, there was a growing availability of the fuel 
following the US shale revolution, its expanding markets via rising demand in Asia, and 
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the potential for it to substitute coal in most regions based on sheer economics (IEA, 
2012; Sernovitz, 2016; Grigas, 2017). Growth in the availability of natural gas paired 
with its potential to alleviate coal-reliance was what underpinned the authoritative 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2011)  to hail the Golden Age of Natural Gas in the 
2011 edition of its prestigious and widely-read World Energy Outlook series. This was 
crucial to inscribe the positive narrative connotation stakeholders and consumers linked 
to the fuel, even if the report had emphasised that the fuel’s future was bright in 
developing markets while many questions loomed large in Europe regarding its future. 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative’s (MITEI) (2011) 
prominent ‘The Future of Natural Gas’ report also heavily contributed to codifying the 
positive descriptor of the fuel, which it labelled as a bridge fuel. They also argued that 
natural gas could help alleviate air pollution relatively quickly, until low carbon 
technologies are developed. This message subsequently surfaced in a number of other 
prominent reports (European Gas Advocacy Forum, 2011; IGU, 2015; IEA, 2016, 2017). 
This line of interpretation was expanded in these reports by arguments emphasising 
that natural gas’ transition or bridge role was also linked to its ability to complement 
renewables as the energy transition develops. It was deemed an ideal fuel to help 
overcome the volatility in renewable energy production, since natural gas power plants 
(especially open cycle gas turbines) could ramp up electricity generation relatively 
quickly, when energy from wind or solar rays halts. It could also complement 
renewables (while alleviating some emissions by substituting more polluting fossil 
fuels) in sectors that are difficult or costly to electrify, primarily heat production of 
various sorts and industrial applications (Smil, 2015). 
The proliferating narrative that natural gas was a transition fuel also drove some 
criticism, given its risks of perpetuating lock-ins. Byrne et al. (2006) criticised these 
positions as greenwashing12 natural gas. Howarth (2014) labeled natural gas as a bridge 
to nowhere, given the risks associated with heightened methane emissions and thereby 
high life-cycle emissions as well as society’s ability to overcome the lock-in of the fuel. 
Proponents of the bridge and transition fuel narratives argued that consumers would 
                                                 
12 For discussions on greenwashing in general see: (Lippert, 2011) and for natural gas-specific discussions 
see: (Byrne, Toly and Glover, 2006; Stephenson, Doukas and Shaw, 2012). 
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gradually phase the fuel out, but such long-term planning or related discussions did not 
surface in the sector’s discourse or that of policy-makers. Generally any sort of planning 
that targeted natural gas consumption was absent from the Commission’s approach to 
the fuel since it had no jurisdiction over the specific fuel mixes of member states 
according to the Treaty of Lisbon13—it had to take a technology neutral approach. In 
principle, it could not favour nor hinder the expansion of natural gas explicitly on any 
grounds, including climate and environmental. On the other hand, both its actions and 
the discursive framing of the fuel reflected preference to sustaining (or expanding) its 
role, despite the objections of a number of experts. 
The Commission may have had limited influence over national energy policies, 
but it had accrued vast powers over EU action to enhance energy security and to further 
climate policy. The natural gas crises posed a wake-up call for national governments, 
underscoring the vulnerabilities that came with energy import dependency.  The 
Commission’s leadership in developing the protocols and mechanisms to curb supply 
security threats was crucial, which also bode well with the further intervening in the 
market and facilitating integration. It assumed that competition among suppliers and 
infrastructure integration allowing unimpeded distribution of the fuel would underpin 
supply security. Environmental considerations also underpinned the expansion of 
natural gas markets in the short-term, as noted in a 2009 working document: “[g]as has 
an important role as a transition fuel in the move towards a high-efficiency, low-carbon 
energy system”14. Seemingly, goals of increasing energy security, competition, and 
reducing emissions by relying increasingly on natural gas complemented one-another, 
but the risks of lock-ins were becoming increasingly problematic—an essential 
consideration given the three to five decades for which natural gas infrastructure is 
typically used. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The contradiction is clear when one compares Article 192 and Article 194 of the Consolidated Version 
on the Functioning of the European Union (C 326/133), 26.10.2012. 
14 SEC(2009) 979 final, 16.07.2009. 
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6. Energy Union and the Clean Energy Package: from energy security to an 
energy transition 
Europe’s dependence on natural gas imports has prohibited it from shaking 
energy security concerns. These fears dominated the Commission’s agenda following the 
2006 and 2009 crises, but were exacerbated with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea 
and its subsequent involvement in eastern Ukraine. The latter did not impact natural gas 
supplies, but sustained the prominence of security of supply on the policy agenda (Van 
de Graaf and Colgan, 2016). The Commission responded15 to supply security concerns 
by shifting its focus to facilitate competition reflected in the Third Energy Package to 
emphasising a need to pivot away from solely market-based coordination mechanisms 
to solidarity and coordination in times of crisis. The new operational provisions of the 
Gas Coordination Group was a first step in this direction in 201116 and was to be 
followed by further actions, such as the introduction of the Projects of Common 
Interest17 (PCI). These were projects the Commission aimed to support and provide 
financing for if they allowed (multiple) (member) states to enhance energy security. 
PCIs became one of the focal financing instruments that expanded the Commission’s 
ability to facilitate EU market integration, reduce supply security threats, and, 
ultimately, exercise greater control over the natural gas market’s development 
trajectory. 
EU policy-makers took further action to counter supply security risks by 
designing the contours of the Energy Union. This was first proposed by the European 
Council’s president Donald Tusk (2014) and the Commission snatched at the 
opportunity to hone a more extensive EU energy strategy. Ideas for an Energy Union 
were compiled in a widely leaked paper (Stollmeyer, 2015), which was shaped by 
member states and lobby groups before the final Communication18 was published in 
February 2015 (Evans, 2015). This was to be the policy vehicle that ensures EU energy 
                                                 
15 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, 12.11.2010 and Commission Decision 2011/C 236/09, 11.08.2011 were 
key in these endeavours. Neither included any reference to sustainability or climate change related 
concerns. 
16 Commission Decision 2011/C 236/09, 11.08.2011. 
17 Prompted by European Parliament resolution 2011/2034(INI) [P7_TA(2011)0318], 05.07.2011; 
followed by Commission notice no. 2013/C 33 E/06, 05.02.2013; followed by Regulation (EU) No. 
347/2013, 17.04.2013 and Regulation (EU) No. 1391/2013, 14.10.2013. 
18 COM(2015) 080 final, 25.02.2015. 
- 13 - 
John Szabó / Climate action in the European Commission’s natural gas policy 
 
security. It reflected an anticipation that natural gas was set to continue to play a 
prominent role in the EU’s energy mix for decades to come by focusing on how the EU 
will distribute the fuel, as opposed to questioning the need for its consumption 
altogether. The EU’s climate policies had begun to support energy efficiency measures 
simultaneously, but these remained in their infancy and had a relatively limited reach 
with respect to natural gas even though it played a leading role in enhancing the supply 
security of oil markets: “[g]iven the EU’s import dependence and global climate change 
challenges, we need to take additional measures to reduce its oil consumption”19. 
The Energy Union also consolidated the role of the Commission in EU energy 
affairs, which became the de facto regulator of the EU’s energy markets. It also expanded 
the role of the Commission’s technocratic arm, the Agency for Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), whose technical decision-making capacities and scope of action 
increased. As climate change’s prominence increased on the Commission’s agenda—it 
introduced the 2030 emission reduction targets and the long-term aim to become 
carbon neutral by 2050 (European Commission, 2011, 2013)—signs that it would curtail 
support for natural gas also surfaced. One domain for this was the quasi-freezing of 
natural gas PCIs. Since 2014, the Commission backed very few natural gas-related PCIs 
and began to move its support to electricity grid developments that would cater to both 
energy security enhancement and renewable integration. The industry anticipated a 
declining trend of policy-makers actively supporting natural gas infrastructure, but 
incumbents deemed it a relatively minor dent in the overall prospects of the fuel. 
The natural gas industry still assumed that it was still in a safe space through 
most of 2015, but this was set to change with the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) and 
the subsequent introduction of the Clean Energy Package for All Europeans 
Communication20. The historic agreement providing legitimacy for further climate 
action, which the Commission would willingly lead. It effectively turned the Energy 
Union from an energy security vehicle to one devoted to an energy transition. The 
Commission led action by introducing the Clean Energy for All Europeans 
                                                 
19 COM(2015) 080 final, 25.02.2015, p. 5. 
20 COM(2016) 860, 30.11.2016. 
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Communication21 (also referred to as the Winter Package) in late-2016 to “boost the 
clean energy transition by modernising our economy” (Sefcovic, 2016, n.p.) by building 
on the Energy Union and the European Council’s 2030 climate and energy policy 
framework. It provides the missing pieces to implement the 2030 goals, and, in-turn, 
move toward meeting COP21 commitments. The tools by which the Commission would 
enforce its will also became increasingly evident as the governance structure of the 
Energy Union22, through its control and oversight over the National Energy and Climate 
Plans, for example. 
The Clean Energy Package overwhelmingly focused on renewables and 
electrification, sending a strong signal as to what its priorities were. The Package heeds 
little attention to natural gas. This has two reasons. As mentioned, the Commission 
sought to pursue a path of decarbonisation based on renewables and electrification. 
However, the natural gas did not push to be included in the policy package, arguing that 
it was still preoccupied with adjusting to the Third Energy Package and did not want to 
face further disruptions. Their underlying assumption in this position was that their fuel 
remains an indispensable component of the EU’s energy mix. The Commission’s focus on 
renewables led it to take a harder anti-fossil fuel stance than in previous policy papers, 
which became evident with the Package’s criticism of fossil fuel subsidies. The EU-body 
articulated steps to ramp up action against inefficient fossil fuel subsidies for carbon-
intensive fuels, impacting subsidies which in 2015 amounted to €6.6 billion and were 
linked to “the legacy of historical investment subsidies, fossil fuel investment grants, 
feed in tariffs, fuel tax exemptions, electricity production, and decommissioning and 
waste disposal”23. The Commission sought to halt these in the future. 
The Commission intervened directly in the EU’s energy market with the Clean 
Energy Package by devising an energy strategy that was compatible with its climate 
policy. Until then, the two realms essentially existed in a bifurcated manner. Climate 
action had limited reach and impact on fossil fuel consumption, but this changed with 
the Commission’s decision to openly support renewables and electrification. It indicated 
                                                 
21 COM(2016) 860, 30.11.2016. 
22 COM(2015) 572 final, 18.11.2015. 
23 COM(2016) 860, 30.11.2016, p. 6. 
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that renewables were the future and all other source fuels will only be considered if they 
are carbon neutral. The natural gas industry may have opted out of the Package, but in 
hindsight regretted this decision, since the EU turned a corner without including their 
fuel. Policy-makers also deemed the sole focus on electrification and renewables a 
mistake, since it only offered a piecemeal EU energy strategy, given that available 
technology did not allow full-electrification. This point was underscored by the powerful 
lobby of electricity generators, Eurelectric (2018), which presented electricity-heavy 
future energy scenarios, but of these none were able to achieve more than an 80% 
electrification. Anything higher would be technologically extremely challenging, costly, 
or outright impossible. The Commission realised its omission and returned to the 
drawing board to devise how it can design an energy transition that would be 
economically and technologically feasible. 
7. A concerted response from the natural gas industry  
Natural gas industry incumbents saw little need to devise a (long-term) strategy 
presentable to EU decision-makers until the launch of the Clean Energy Package. 
Incumbents merely focused on distinguishing their fuel from other fossil fuels by 
emphasising the transitory role it could play. Meanwhile, policy-makers and NGOs 
focused most of their attention on coal—an act the natural gas industry embraced, since 
it would support coal-to-gas switching. However, the clouds were gathering above the 
fuel and its industry’s incumbents with the Paris Agreement and the Clean Energy 
Package, since these shifted focus to electrification and renewable-based electricity 
generation, while not allocating a specific role for natural gas. This mobilised 
stakeholders, which also introduced unprecedented cooperation between various 
actors. Until then, natural gas industry incumbents had been a highly divided group of 
actors that sought to capitalise on their various assets. There was little cooperation and 
alignment between producers—within which further division sustained between 
Norwegians, Russians, etc.—transmission system operators, other infrastructure 
owners (e.g. storage of LNG terminals), and the myriad of distribution system owners 
who pursued their interests assuming a certain shielding from climate policy predicated 
on the characteristics of their fuel. 
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This is not to say that the natural gas industry was not a group of powerful actors 
that sought to exercise political power, but rather that it was relatively disorganised and 
did not have any cross-industry strategy to sustain its business. Until recently, the main 
advocacy groups for natural gas were not particularly strong at the EU-level, especially 
compared to that of coal’s or electricity’s, given their understanding that natural gas will 
be a transition fuel. Eurogas, the most prominent natural gas lobby group, included 
multiple players who also had extensive interests in the coal industry as well. This 
curbed its scope of action, since it could not lobby too extensively for coal-to-gas 
switching. Simultaneously, natural gas industry players have also had significant 
influence on decision-makers at the highest levels. A typical example in the industry is 
Gerhard Schröder, the former chancellor of Germany becoming the President of Nord 
Stream’s—a significant pipeline project connecting Russia and Germany—board. 
Beyond such high-profile cases, the natural gas industry has deployed just over a 
thousand lobbyist and spent €100 million on lobbying in 2016 alone, compared to the 
€3.4 million to counter-lobby which supported the public’s interest (CEO, 2017)—
reflecting that stakeholders actively sought to influence policy-makers. 
Policy-makers began to question the sustainability of natural gas and the role that 
it can play in the EU’s energy future. This was partly based on a growing attention to life-
cycle emissions of the fuel: methane emissions had been left unaccounted for, despite it 
being a potent greenhouse gas that slips into the atmosphere throughout the natural gas 
supply chain. Moreover, squaring natural gas consumption with the EU’s climate policy 
became increasingly untenable in the long run. Lock-ins posed a significant problem, 
given the long-term investment infrastructure owners made when constructing a 
pipeline, for instance (Unruh, 2000). The confluence of these factors raised the point 
that the natural gas sector was in a precarious position with an undefined future. The 
industry realised that, until then, it had provided little indication of how the fuel’s role 
will develop in the future and simply relied on proclaiming that it was the proprietor of 
the cleanest fossil fuel, which insulated it from climate action. However, this would not 
suffice in the future. 
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Natural gas industry incumbents leapt into action upon being confronted with the 
existential threat climate action posed. Actors continued to emphasise that it was a 
flexible, wide-available source-fuel that could complement intermittent renewables. Key 
natural gas industry incumbents also emphasised and popularised that switching to 
natural gas from more polluting fuels was a strategic objective to execute climate action. 
Eurogas pointed out that coal-to-gas switching can curtail emissions by up to 5 
percentage points (Braaksma, 2018), while Equinor (formerly Statoil) (2017) argued 
that such fuel-switching was focal to underpin the credibility of the EU’s climate 
strategy. These positions were generally backed by industries and their lobby groups 
reliant on the fuel, including as Eurofer, the EU steel association, and Cembureau, the EU 
cement association. Coal-to-gas switching continues to have a limited impact, but it was 
Eurelectric’s (2018) influential findings that prompted policy-makers to consider that 
they could not electrify all modes of energy consumption, leading them to consider in 
what form gas can be a part of the EU’s decarbonised energy system. 
Natural gas stakeholders acknowledged the threat climate change posed to their 
sheer existence, leading the sector to convey a more unified stance by developing a 
common narrative on how their fuel could be a part of the EU’s energy future. European 
transmission system operators were the first to take concerted action to ensure that 
their businesses survived in a decarbonised world. This decision was heavily shaped by 
the path dependence created by their immobile infrastructure. Unlike producers, they 
were unable to shift their revenue earning models to other geographies24 and could only 
remain in business by becoming a part of a decarbonised energy system. TSOs 
highlighted the need for some strategic action on behalf of the industry and prompted 
other stakeholders to begin to consider how they can play a role in a decarbonised 
energy system. The natural gas industry had to devise a common message that they 
could provide an end-fuel, as opposed to a transition fuel. This strategy was pertinent, as 
underpinned by a study commissioned by Friends of the Earth, unequivocally stating 
that “[f]ossil fuels (including natural gas) have no substantial role in an EU 2°C energy 
system beyond 2035” (Anderson and Broderick, 2017, p. 5). 
                                                 
24 As examples, we can bring up Gazprom’s diversification of exports from Europe to Asia (Power of 
Siberia pipeline) and interest in developing LNG export terminals. 
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The industry’s largest effort to shape EU policy and secure its future has been 
manifest in its bid to create a narrative of an energy future that includes gas (Jameson, 
1982; Szeman, 2019)—be that as natural gas or methane in a decarbonised form. A key 
point of influence has been the Commission’s limited capacities and the technical know-
how of the industry leading policy-makers to frequently rely on studies conducted by 
external consultants and industry representatives. The latter may look to seek 
objectivity, but they are also well-aware of the influence these estimates have and their 
ability to skew figures according to strategic interests. Framing is essential since 
narratives also shape the connotation, planned futures, and general relation of policy-
makers to fuel—even if this is based on sound material characteristics. Reports have 
become crucial, since the Commission’s bid to devise an energy future for the EU has 
been reliant on gathering data and assessing the role various fuels can play. 
The Commission has tasked natural gas industry incumbents to provide the input 
which will be the basis of further market engineering i.e. the trajectory of the EU’s 
energy transition. At recent Madrid Forum’s25 stakeholders have extensively debated 
the future of natural gas and policy-makers have been tasked to write studies that help 
establish the future of natural gas (European Commission, 2017, 2018a; Borchardt, 
2019). Amongst others, the advocacy group of hydrocarbon producers, IOGP26, has been 
tasked to explore CCS, while the infrastructure lobby group GIE will have to assess 
methane emissions. While these actors are well-prepared to explore these issues, the 
reliance of policy-makers on this technical knowledge also leaves them susceptible to 
devising further natural gas policy that incorporates climate considerations in a manner 
that favours the industry over the common good and the reaching of climate targets. 
Industry sources and advocacy groups argue that they too strive to provide well-
founded research, but simultaneously, they openly acknowledge that these studies are 
influential in shaping the role of natural gas in decarbonisation and that key industry 
                                                 
25 The Madrid Forum has been a key platform where the Commission has historically discussed natural 
gas market technicalities with stakeholders, but, in recent years, this has turned into a forum where EU 
natural gas policy is discussed. The turning point, here too was the Paris Agreement and the Clean Energy 
Package, following which the focus of the Forum shifted towards how natural gas can be adapted to suit 
climate policy.  
26 International Association of Oil & Gas Producers. 
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voices (e.g. ENTSO-G’s) are being heard by policy-makers. The conflict of interest is 
trivial. 
The representation of interests at the Madrid Forum is also highly asymmetrical, 
with NGOs excluded from the proverbial table. Participants are limited to the industry, 
policy-makers, and a few academics. The Forum has, however, provided a platform 
through which the industry can square the circle by allowing the Commission to meet its 
climate policy goals and maintain natural gas consumption. The European Commission, 
Eurogas, European Federation of Local Energy Companies (CEDEC), Gas for Climate27, 
and European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) all 
emphasised the need to incorporate gas as a mixture of its various forms into the EU’s 
decarbonised energy future (European Commission, 2017, 2018a). The utilisation of 
infrastructure also underpins these considerations, since the EU has a vast natural gas 
grid that should not be left unused (Trinomics, 2018). These have led the Commission to 
state in its A Clean Planet for all communication, the Commission (2018b) states that: 
“[s]ustainable renewable heating will continue to play a major role and gas, including 
liquefied natural gas, mixed with hydrogen, or e-methane produced from renewable 
electricity and biogas mixtures could all play a key role in existing buildings as well as in 
many industrial applications” (p. 8). 
8. Conclusion 
In the course of the past three decades, natural gas has gone from being 
understood as the most preferable fossil fuel to one for which its industry has to create a 
narrative to maintain its relevance in the EU’s energy mix. Through most of the 1990s 
and the aughts, the European Commission’s climate agenda had very little impact on its 
natural gas market engineering. Both supply and demand of the fuel rose, while policy-
makers focused on enhancing competition and creating a single EU market. 
Environmental and climate considerations were mentioned in policies, but did not have 
a particularly strong impact. During this period the understanding that natural gas was 
the least polluting fossil fuel was normalised, allowing stakeholders to assume that it 
                                                 
27 A group of seven EU gas transit firms: Enagás, Fluxys, Gasunie, GRTgaz, Open Grid Europe, Snam, and 
Teréga, in addition to two renewable gas industry associations: the European Biogas Association and 
Consorzio Italiano Biogas. 
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had a key role to play when the energy transition would kick into full swing. Academics 
identified natural gas to be able to play the role of a transition fuel, which, in principle, 
could even benefit the consumption of natural gas. However, as long as the 
Commission’s climate policy did not have a sufficient impact on energy policy, the 
transition fuel descriptor played a marginal and more-or-less unimportant role. 
As the Commission began to introduce stringent climate action, the narrative that 
natural gas is the transition fuel was increasingly emphasised by industry incumbents. It 
shaped the policies the Commission introduced to govern of the fuel’s markets, since 
climate policy tools were designed to target more polluting fossil fuels and support 
renewables before beginning to address natural gas. The transition fuel discourse also 
grew another leg, as the fuel provides an ideal complement to renewables. Despite 
extensive efforts to promulgate the transition fuel discourse and shape events to 
support this vision, the narrative had little tangible impact. This was due to the setting in 
which the EU’s energy transition unfolded: coal remained to be prominent in the EU, 
renewables were increasingly competitive, and the EU ETS was ineffective. The large-
scale coal-to-gas switching many had envisioned in the early-2010s never materialised. 
Following the Paris Agreement, it became clear that the EU had to pursue more 
ambitious climate policies to avert the destructive impact of climate change. The 
Commission’s ambition threatened the role natural gas could play, since thinking shifted 
to focus on achieving a decarbonised economy as quickly as possible. This also implied 
the need to phase out emitting methane from the energy system, especially given the 
rising concerns over lifecycle emissions. The favourable framing of the fuel or being the 
lesser of the evils did not suffice anymore. Now that the Commission had been 
empowered to take increasingly stringent climate action, the industry’s future became 
precarious. Industry actors responded by developing and promulgating another 
narrative, shifting focus from methane being a transition fuel to the possibility of 
decarbonising it. This has been supported by policy-makers, who acknowledged the 
continued need for gaseous fuels in the EU’s energy system. The natural gas industry has 
been successful in promoting a decarbonised vision—that includes methane-based fuels 
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in some form—for the EU’s energy future, instead of a sustainable vision—solely reliant 
on renewables. 
The natural gas industry’s story provides unique insights into how an industry 
can become locked into its own paradigm and hinder its ability to react to a quickly 
changing environment. An understanding that natural gas will become a transition fuel 
was widely accepted by policy-makers and those involved with the energy sector at-
large, which reassured the natural gas industry that its future was secured. If anything, 
demand for its fuel would increase. This narrative coupled with the fuel’s lock-in led the 
industry ignore the Commission’s changing focus. As climate change became more 
pressing and the Commission more powerful, it was in a better position to take climate 
action and address all fossil fuels, irrespective of their relative emissions. The natural 
gas industry—drawing on its extensive power bases (e.g. infrastructure, lobby, narrative 
creation, technology)—has since leapt into action and mobilised around the common 
cause for the need to sustain its operations. The impact of its efforts will however only 
be seen years from now. 
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